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Beckwith and Koukl: Relativism's Seven Fatal Flaws
and personal preferences, but you
can’t say they are wrong.
Nor may you critique, challenge,
praise, or fault them. It would be like
trying to keep score in a game with
no rules or putting a criminal on
trial when there are no laws.
To illustrate, relativists cannot
object on moral grounds to any
form of racism or cultural imperialism if those actions are consistent
with the perpetrator’s personal
moral understanding of what is
right and good. What sense can be
made of the judgment “apartheid is
wrong” spoken by a relativist? What
just ideation is there to intervene?
Certainly not human rights, for
there are no objective rights in relativism because there are no rights or
wrongs of any kind. As former
Attorney General Ramsey Clarke
once said, one person’s terrorist is
another person’s freedom fighter. It
would be inconsistent for the same
car to sport the bumper stickers
“Pro-choice” and “End Apartheid.”
Relativism is the ultimate prochoice position, because it legitimizes every personal choice—even
the choice to be a racist.
Nor can lying be wrong, even if
the lie perverts justice and condemns an innocent person. In fact,
there is no real difference between
one who is guilty and one who is
innocent because in relativism, guilt
and innocence are meaningless distinctions.
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RELATIVISM’S
SEVEN FATAL FLAWS
Where would we be if relativism were true?

M

oral accountability, evil,
praise, blame, justice, fairness, moral improvement,
moral discourse, and tolerance all seem to be concepts
that have meaning apparent to our
moral common sense. Each is justified by moral intuition, yet relativism renders them all meaningless.
If these moral notions are valid yet
are inconsistent with moral relativism, then relativism must be false.
There are at least seven flaws of
relativism that point to its bankruptcy.

ONE
Relativists can’t accuse others of
wrongdoing. Relativism makes it
impossible to criticize the behavior of
others because it ultimately denies

such a thing as wrongdoing. If you
believe morality is a matter of personal definition, then you surrender
the possibility of making moral judgments about others’ actions, no matter how offensive they are to your
intuitive sense of right or wrong. You
may express your emotions, tastes,
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The notion of a promise is also
empty. A promise is not just a statement of intent about the future but
also entails the moral obligation to
fulfill the intent. That’s why changing one’s mind is different from
breaking a promise, a distinction
lost in relativism. No contract could
ever have any moral force. Marriage
vows would be empty words, providing no comfort or protection for
spouses and no stability for families.
There can be no accountability in
relativism. Those who answer to
themselves ultimately answer to no
one of consequence. And this makes
it impossible to distinguish relativistic morality from self-interest or
ethical egoism.
Further, if morality is an individual call, and if moral wrong is the
kind of error for which punishment
seems to be justified, then all punishment would have to be approved
by the individual responsible for the
“immoral” conduct.
This is the first law of relativism:
When right or wrong are a matter of
personal choice, we surrender the
privilege of making moral judgments on others’ actions. But if our
moral intuition rebels against these
consequences of relativism—if we’re
sure that some things must be wrong
and that some judgments against the
conduct of others are justified—
then relativism is false.

49

BY FRANCIS J. BECKWITH AND GREGORY KOUKL*

RELATIVISM’S
SEVEN FATAL FLAWS
Where would we be if relativism were true?

M

oral accountability, evil,
praise, blame, justice, fairness, moral improvement,
moral discourse, and tolerance all seem to be concepts
that have meaning apparent to our
moral common sense. Each is justified by moral intuition, yet relativism renders them all meaningless.
If these moral notions are valid yet
are inconsistent with moral relativism, then relativism must be false.
There are at least seven flaws of
relativism that point to its bankruptcy.

such a thing as wrongdoing. If you
believe morality is a matter of personal definition, then you surrender
the possibility of making moral judgments about others’ actions, no matter how offensive they are to your
intuitive sense of right or wrong. You
may express your emotions, tastes,
Reprinted, by permission, from Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl,
Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in
Mid-Air (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Baker Books, 1998). Francis J. Beckwith is Associate Director of the J. M.
Dawson Institute of Church-State
Studies, and Associate Professor of
Church-State Studies at Baylor University. Gregory Koukl is President of
Stand to Reason Ministries and Host
of “Stand to Reason,” a live weekly
radio talk show aired on the west coast
of the United States.

ONE
Relativists can’t accuse others of
wrongdoing. Relativism makes it
impossible to criticize the behavior of
others because it ultimately denies

48

Perspective Digest, Vol. 10 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 5
and personal preferences, but you
The notion of a promise is also
can’t say they are wrong.
empty. A promise is not just a stateNor may you critique, challenge, ment of intent about the future but
praise, or fault them. It would be like
also entails the moral obligation to
trying to keep score in a game with
fulfill the intent. That’s why changno rules or putting a criminal on
ing one’s mind is different from
trial when there are no laws.
breaking a promise, a distinction
To illustrate, relativists cannot lost in relativism. No contract could
object on moral grounds to any ever have any moral force. Marriage
form of racism or cultural imperialvows would be empty words, proism if those actions are consistent
viding no comfort or protection for
with the perpetrator’s personal spouses and no stability for famimoral understanding of what is
lies.
There can be no accountability in
right and good. What sense can be
made of the judgment “apartheid is relativism. Those who answer to
wrong” spoken by a relativist? What themselves ultimately answer to no
one of consequence. And this makes
just ideation is there to intervene?
Certainly not human rights, for it impossible to distinguish relativistic morality from self-interest or
there are no objective rights in relativism because there are no rights or ethical egoism.
Further, if morality is an individwrongs of any kind. As former
Attorney General Ramsey Clarke ual call, and if moral wrong is the
kind of error for which punishment
once said, one person’s terrorist is
seems to be justified, then all punanother person’s freedom fighter. It
would be inconsistent for the same ishment would have to be approved
by the individual responsible for the
car to sport the bumper stickers
“Pro-choice” and “End Apartheid.” “immoral” conduct.
This is the first law of relativism:
Relativism is the ultimate proWhen right or wrong are a matter of
choice position, because it legitpersonal choice, we surrender the
imizes every personal choice—even
privilege of making moral judgthe choice to be a racist.
ments on others’ actions. But if our
Nor can lying be wrong, even if
moral intuition rebels against these
the lie perverts justice and conconsequences of relativism—if we’re
demns an innocent person. In fact,
sure that some things must be wrong
there is no real difference between
and that some judgments against the
one who is guilty and one who is
conduct of others are justified—
innocent because in relativism, guilt
then relativism is false.
and innocence are meaningless distinctions.
http://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/pd/vol10/iss2/5
49

2

Beckwith and Koukl: Relativism's Seven Fatal Flaws

two
Relativists can’t complain about
the problem of evil. The reality of
evil in the world is one of the first
objections raised against the existence of God. The common argument says that if God is absolutely
powerful and ultimately good, He
would deal with evil. But since evil
exists, God appears too frail to
oppose it or too sinister to care.
The entire objection hinges on
the observation that true evil exists.
The only way one can have this complaint about God is if evil is “out
there” as an objective feature of the
world. Evil can’t be real if morals are
relative to the subject.
Relativism is inconsistent with
the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some
things are objectively wrong. Evil as
a value judgment marks a departure
from some standard of moral perfection. But if there is no standard,
there is no departure. As C. S. Lewis
notes, a portrait is a good or bad
likeness depending on how it compares with the “perfect” original.
Relativism denies such a standard. This was a serious problem for
Lewis: “My argument against God
was that the universe seemed so
cruel and unjust. But how had I got
this idea of just and unjust? A man
does not call a line crooked unless he

has some idea of a straight line.
What was I comparing this universe
with when I called it unjust? . . . Of
course, I could have given up my
idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But
if I did that, then my argument
against God collapsed, too—for the
argument depended on saying that
the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please
my private fancies.”1
If relativism is true, the objection
against God based on evil vanishes.
There is no true evil to discuss, only
differing opinions about what is
pleasant or unpleasant, desired or
not desired.
This point was made clear in the
movie The Quarrel. The main characters, Hersh and Chiam, grew up
together but separated because of a
dispute about God and evil. Then
came the Holocaust, and each
thought the other had perished.
Reunited by chance after the war,
they become embroiled once again
in their boyhood quarrel. Hersh,
now a rabbi, offers this challenge to
the secularist Chiam: “If there’s
nothing in the universe that’s higher
than human beings, then what’s
morality? Well, it’s a matter of opinion. I like milk; you like meat. Hitler
likes to kill people; I like to save
them. Who’s to say which is better?
“Do you begin to see the horror
of this? If there is no Master of the
universe, then who’s to say that
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Relativism is inconsistent with the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some things are objectively wrong.
Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from some standard of
moral perfection. But if there is no standard, there is no departure.
As C. S. Lewis notes, a portrait is a good or bad likeness depending
on how it compares with the “perfect” original.

Hitler did anything wrong? If there
is no God, then the people that
murdered your wife and kids did
nothing wrong.”
The approach many relativists
take at this point is confused. First,
they say that the Holocaust was evil
and ask why God would allow such
depravity. Later, when the tables
turn and their own behavior is in
question, they argue that morality is
merely a matter of opinion. This
reduces their earlier objection to,
How could a good God allow things
that are contrary to my opinion?
Moral relativism and objective
evil are strange bedfellows. They
couldn’t possibly both be true at the
same time. If morality is ultimately a
matter of personal tastes, like preferring steak over broccoli or brussels
sprouts, the argument against God’s
existence based on the problem of
evil vanishes. Relativists must surrender this objection.
If, however, it seems legitimate to
raise the issue of evil in the world,
then relativism can’t be true.

3

three
Relativists can’t place blame or
accept praise. Relativism renders the
concepts of praise and blame meaningless, because no external standard
of measurement defines what
should be applauded or condemned.
Without absolutes, nothing is
ultimately bad, deplorable, tragic, or
worthy of blame. Neither is anything
ultimately good, honorable, noble,
or worthy of praise. It’s all lost in a
twilight zone of moral nothingness.
Relativists are almost always
inconsistent here. They seek to avoid
blame but readily accept praise. C. S.
Lewis notes that our habits of welcoming praise and of making excuses to avoid blame evidence our
deep commitment to objective
morality: “The truth is, we believe in
decency so much—we feel the Rule
or Law pressing on us so—that we
cannot bear to face the fact that we
are breaking it, and consequently we
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treaties do not matter,” says Lewis,
“but then, next minute, they spoil
their case by saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an
unfair one. But if treaties do not
matter, and if there is no such thing
as Right and Wrong . . . what is the
difference between a fair treaty and
an unfair one?”3
If relativism is true, then there is
no such thing as justice or fairness.
Both concepts depend on an objective standard of what is right. If the
notions of justice and fairness make
sense, however, then relativism is
defeated.

Further, there is no motive to improve. Relativism destroys
the moral impulse that compels people to rise above themselves
because there is no “above” to rise to, ethically speaking.
Why change our moral point of view if it serves our self-interest
and feels good for the time being?

try to shift the responsibility. For
you notice that it is only for our bad
behavior that we find all these explanations. It is only our bad temper
that we put down to being tired or
worried or hungry; we put our good
temper down to ourselves.”2
B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond
Freedom and Dignity that humans
are simply biological machines
whose conduct is determined by a
mixture of biology and environment. In Walden II, his description
of the brave new world founded on
principles of behavior modification,
the concepts of praise and blame are
portrayed as completely meaningless. Morality is a fiction.
In like fashion, relativists must
remove the words praise and blame
from their vocabularies. But if the
notions of praise and blame are
valid, then relativism must be false.

four
Relativists can’t make charges of
unfairness or injustice. Justice and

fairness are two more concepts that
don’t make sense in a world devoid
of moral absolutes. Under relativism, these notions are incoherent
for two reasons.
First, the words themselves have
no meaning. Both concepts dictate
that people receive equal treatment
based on an external standard of
what is right. This outside standard,
though, is the very thing repudiated
by relativists. After all, how can there
be justice or fairness if there are no
moral requirements to be just or
fair? It’s not wrong to punish an
innocent person, nor is it immoral
to release the guilty.
Second, there is no possibility of
true moral guilt. Justice entails,
among other things, punishing those
who are guilty. Guilt, however, depends on blame, which we have seen
cannot exist. If nothing is ultimately
immoral, there is no blame and subsequently no guilt worthy of punishment.
People give away their true intuitions about justice and fairness by
their language. “A nation may say
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view if it serves our self-interest and
feels good for the time being?
In relativism, by definition one’s
ethics can never be more “moral” at
one time than another. Morals can
change, but they can never improve.
If, however, moral improvement
seems to be a concept that makes
sense, then relativism can’t be true.

six
Relativists can’t hold meaningful
moral discussions. Relativism makes
it impossible to discuss morality.
What’s there to talk about? A meaningful ethical dialogue can be held
only when moral principles are seen
as universal action guides.
Ethical discourse involves comparing the merits of one view with
another to find which is best. But if
morals are entirely relative and all
views are equal, then no way of
thinking is better than another. No
moral position can be judged adequate or deficient, unreasonable,
unacceptable, or even barbaric.
A. J. Ayer agrees, arguing that ethical statements are meaningless
because they are not empirically verifiable: “We find that argument is possible on moral questions only if some
system of values is presupposed.”4
Ayer’s own view, called emotivism, denies that ethical statements
are anything more than raw expressions of emotion. As such, they have

five
Relativists can’t improve their
morality. With moral relativism,
moral improvement or reform is
impossible. Relativists can change
their personal ethics, but they can
never become better people.
How can one get “better”? Moral
reform implies an objective rule of
conduct as the standard to which we
ought to aspire. But this rule is
exactly what relativists deny. If there
is no better way, there can be no
improvement.
Further, there is no motive to
improve. Relativism destroys the
moral impulse that compels people to
rise above themselves because there is
no “above” to rise to, ethically speaking. Why change our moral point of
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no more content than words like
“Wow!” or “Yuck!” “If a sentence
makes no statement at all, there is
obviously no sense in asking
whether what it says is true or false.
And we have seen that sentences
which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are
pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood.”5
If Ayer is right, then moral education is impossible, because the words
themselves are meaningless. One
can’t even have a moral dispute. Yet
quarrels seem to entail meaningful
moral discussions, as Lewis points
out: “Quarreling means trying to
show that the other man is in the
wrong. And there would be no sense
in trying to do that unless you and he
had some sort of agreement as to
what Right and Wrong are; just as
there would be no sense in saying
that a footballer had committed a
foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.”6
If ethical disputes make sense
only when morals are objective, then
relativism can be lived out consistently only in silence. For this reason, it’s rare to meet a thoroughgoing relativist. Most are quick to
impose moral rules like, It’s wrong
to push your morality on others.
The only course of action truly
consistent with moral relativism is
complete silence. If you view all
morality as relative and you’re con-

sistent, you can’t ever make a moral
recommendation.
This puts relativists in an untenable position, caught coming and
going. If they speak, they surrender
their relativism. If they do not speak,
they surrender their humanity. It’s
inhuman to be mute in the face of
egregious evil, to be silent in the
presence of flagrant injustice.
Those who believe that ethical
truth is relative cannot say anything
further that is morally meaningful.
But if the notion of moral discourse
makes sense intuitively, then moral
relativism is false.

What kind of world would it be if relativism were true?
It would be a world in which nothing is wrong—nothing is
considered evil or good, nothing worthy of praise or blame. It
would be a world in which justice and fairness are meaningless
concepts, in which there would be no accountability, no
possibility of moral improvement, no moral discourse.

seven
Relativists can’t promote the
obligation of tolerance. Finally, there
is no tolerance in relativism, because
the relativists’ moral obligation to be
tolerant is self-refuting.
The principle of tolerance is considered one of the key virtues of relativism. Morals are individual, relativists argue, and therefore we ought
to tolerate the viewpoints of others
and not pass judgment on their
behavior and attitudes.
It should be obvious that this
attempt fails through contradiction.
To relativists, tolerance means, “I
(morally) ought to tolerate the
moral opinions and behavior of others who disagree with me. I (morally) should not try to interfere with
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world in which nothing is wrong—
nothing is considered evil or good,
nothing worthy of praise or blame.
It would be a world in which justice
and fairness are meaningless concepts, in which there would be no
accountability, no possibility of
moral improvement, no moral discourse. And it would be a world in
which there is no tolerance.
Moral relativism produces this
kind of world. The late Dr. Francis
Schaeffer’s remark could well apply
to relativists, who “have both feet
firmly planted in mid-air.”

their opinions or behavior.”7
If there are no objective moral
rules, however, there can be no rule
that requires tolerance as a moral
principle that applies equally to all.
In fact, if there are no moral absolutes, why be tolerant at all? Why
not force my morality on others if
it’s in my self-interest and my personal ethics allow it?
Relativists violate their own principle of tolerance when they do not
tolerate the views of those whose
morality is nonrelativistic. They only
tolerate those who hold their ethical
viewpoint. They are, therefore, just
as intolerant as any objectivist appears to be.
The principle of tolerance is foreign to relativism. If, however, tolerance seems to be a virtue and we
owe a measure of respect to those
who differ with us, then relativism
can’t be true.
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sistent, you can’t ever make a moral
recommendation.
This puts relativists in an untenable position, caught coming and
going. If they speak, they surrender
their relativism. If they do not speak,
they surrender their humanity. It’s
inhuman to be mute in the face of
egregious evil, to be silent in the
presence of flagrant injustice.
Those who believe that ethical
truth is relative cannot say anything
further that is morally meaningful.
But if the notion of moral discourse
makes sense intuitively, then moral
relativism is false.

no more content than words like
“Wow!” or “Yuck!” “If a sentence
makes no statement at all, there is
obviously no sense in asking
whether what it says is true or false.
And we have seen that sentences
which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. They are
pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood.”5
If Ayer is right, then moral education is impossible, because the words
themselves are meaningless. One
can’t even have a moral dispute. Yet
quarrels seem to entail meaningful
moral discussions, as Lewis points
out: “Quarreling means trying to
show that the other man is in the
wrong. And there would be no sense
in trying to do that unless you and he
had some sort of agreement as to
what Right and Wrong are; just as
there would be no sense in saying
that a footballer had committed a
foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.”6
If ethical disputes make sense
only when morals are objective, then
relativism can be lived out consistently only in silence. For this reason, it’s rare to meet a thoroughgoing relativist. Most are quick to
impose moral rules like, It’s wrong
to push your morality on others.
The only course of action truly
consistent with moral relativism is
complete silence. If you view all
morality as relative and you’re con-

seven
Relativists can’t promote the
obligation of tolerance. Finally, there
is no tolerance in relativism, because
the relativists’ moral obligation to be
tolerant is self-refuting.
The principle of tolerance is considered one of the key virtues of relativism. Morals are individual, relativists argue, and therefore we ought
to tolerate the viewpoints of others
and not pass judgment on their
behavior and attitudes.
It should be obvious that this
attempt fails through contradiction.
To relativists, tolerance means, “I
(morally) ought to tolerate the
moral opinions and behavior of others who disagree with me. I (morally) should not try to interfere with
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What kind of world would it be if relativism were true?
It would be a world in which nothing is wrong—nothing is
considered evil or good, nothing worthy of praise or blame. It
would be a world in which justice and fairness are meaningless
concepts, in which there would be no accountability, no
possibility of moral improvement, no moral discourse.

their opinions or behavior.”7
If there are no objective moral
rules, however, there can be no rule
that requires tolerance as a moral
principle that applies equally to all.
In fact, if there are no moral absolutes, why be tolerant at all? Why
not force my morality on others if
it’s in my self-interest and my personal ethics allow it?
Relativists violate their own principle of tolerance when they do not
tolerate the views of those whose
morality is nonrelativistic. They only
tolerate those who hold their ethical
viewpoint. They are, therefore, just
as intolerant as any objectivist appears to be.
The principle of tolerance is foreign to relativism. If, however, tolerance seems to be a virtue and we
owe a measure of respect to those
who differ with us, then relativism
can’t be true.
The Sum of All Flaws
What kind of world would it be if
relativism were true? It would be a
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world in which nothing is wrong—
nothing is considered evil or good,
nothing worthy of praise or blame.
It would be a world in which justice
and fairness are meaningless concepts, in which there would be no
accountability, no possibility of
moral improvement, no moral discourse. And it would be a world in
which there is no tolerance.
Moral relativism produces this
kind of world. The late Dr. Francis
Schaeffer’s remark could well apply
to relativists, who “have both feet
firmly planted in mid-air.”
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